Thursday, December 21, 2006
Begging Your Indulgence
If you will allow me, I wish to speak one more day about the recent spate of signing statements issued by President Bush since there have been some interesting reactions to one in particular.
First, to give you a sense of how the rhetorical signing statement works (that is, if these are fairly arcane and technical documents, how does it mobilize public opinion if it does not get covered in the MSM--sort of like the "tree falling in the woods" example.
In that crazy bill President Bush signed yesterday dealing with a number of subjects, including international trade, it appeared in a website aimed at the textile industry. This site--Fibre 2 Fashion--ran a press release form USTR Susan C. Schwab, applauding President Bush's signing of the bill and referencing the signing statement. Thus it confirms the notion that the rhetorical signing statement isn't directed at mass public opinion, but rather elite opinion since elites are more important to the day to day matters of governing. There is already good evidence that in the aggregate, we know the president will issue more rhetorical signing statements when there is a federal election or when his poll numbers are in a state of flux--but that doesn't tell us much about the use of the device at the individual level. It is a promising area of study that still needs a great deal of attention.
Speaking of the rhetorical presidency--Yesterday I wrote about the President using the Indian Treaty Room as a way to reinforce his message of maintaining a strong war footing. In today's Washington Post, Dana Milbank also remarks on the unusual choice of a room to hold a press briefing.
Next, the signing statement President Bush issued regarding the trade of nuclear material to India is taking on some interesting characteristics as well as criticisms. Further, it is also quickly becoming clear that the challenges in the signing statement may not have much to do with separation of powers concerns, or concerns over presidential prerogatives, but rather domestic and foreign politics.
The President, it seems, was taking on heat from India when the bill landed on his desk. It seems that India did not much care for the intrusion upon Indian sovereignty in a couple of provisions of the bill. If you recall from my discussion of the signing statement, Sections 103 and 104 were among those the President cited as problematic. In Section 103, Congress outlined eight distinct declarations of foreign policy regarding the sale of nuclear material to India. The Congress were concerned mostly with nuclear material winding up in the hands of Iran, and thus mandated "...that presidents should report each year on whether India was fully cooperating to restrain the Iranian nuclear program." When President Bush signed the bill, he treated that demand as "advisory."
The author of this provision, Senator Tom Harkin (D.IA) has not taken lightly to President Bush's signing statement, arguing that it is "...outrageous that the President has repeatedly stated the greatest threat to U.S. national security is a nuclear Iran, yet explicitly rejects Congress’ declaration that it shall be the official policy of the United States that India will not use its nuclear technology to help develop Iran’s nuclear weapons arsenal" and with his signing statement has "...once again...shown he views Congress as a nuisance rather than an equal branch of government under the Constitution."
In addition, one part of Section 104 required the Nuclear Suppliers Group to sign off on the deal before it becomes binding. The NSG, which consists of 45 countries, was formed in 1974 in response to India's detonation of a nuclear bomb and is designed to enforce non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular by states that are considered outlaw or renegade in the international community (like Iran). President Bush also treated the NSG action as advisory, which has drawn the ire of Congressman Ed Markey (D.MA), who stated: "The President is turning decades of U.S. international policy on its head--and [is] thumbing his nose at Congress at the same time." Others worry that if the NSG refuses to sign off, President Bush will simply go forward and ignore the international organization, thus destroying an organization dedicated to keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of renegade states as well as undermining US credibility in the World on yet another issue.
But from the President's POV, he was catching a great deal of heat from India over what they perceived to be overly hostile language from the Congress, and language that does not treat the country as a sovereign nation. Leaders in India were "outraged" over the language prior to President Bush's signing statement, expressing concerns about "...certain extraneous and prescriptive clauses that may limit its strategic autonomy and independence of its foreign policy", and even after the signing statement, the "Prime Minister...still has some concerns." It is clear that from a foreign policy standpoint, the United States needs India as a balance to the growing influence of China, as well as a logger-head in the region to fight the GWOT.
So this is continuing to play out, but regardless of how it concludes, it gives us a nice insight into some of the pressures that drive a signing statement, and that it isn't always just the protection of prerogatives despite what the language may say.
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First, to give you a sense of how the rhetorical signing statement works (that is, if these are fairly arcane and technical documents, how does it mobilize public opinion if it does not get covered in the MSM--sort of like the "tree falling in the woods" example.
In that crazy bill President Bush signed yesterday dealing with a number of subjects, including international trade, it appeared in a website aimed at the textile industry. This site--Fibre 2 Fashion--ran a press release form USTR Susan C. Schwab, applauding President Bush's signing of the bill and referencing the signing statement. Thus it confirms the notion that the rhetorical signing statement isn't directed at mass public opinion, but rather elite opinion since elites are more important to the day to day matters of governing. There is already good evidence that in the aggregate, we know the president will issue more rhetorical signing statements when there is a federal election or when his poll numbers are in a state of flux--but that doesn't tell us much about the use of the device at the individual level. It is a promising area of study that still needs a great deal of attention.
Speaking of the rhetorical presidency--Yesterday I wrote about the President using the Indian Treaty Room as a way to reinforce his message of maintaining a strong war footing. In today's Washington Post, Dana Milbank also remarks on the unusual choice of a room to hold a press briefing.
Next, the signing statement President Bush issued regarding the trade of nuclear material to India is taking on some interesting characteristics as well as criticisms. Further, it is also quickly becoming clear that the challenges in the signing statement may not have much to do with separation of powers concerns, or concerns over presidential prerogatives, but rather domestic and foreign politics.
The President, it seems, was taking on heat from India when the bill landed on his desk. It seems that India did not much care for the intrusion upon Indian sovereignty in a couple of provisions of the bill. If you recall from my discussion of the signing statement, Sections 103 and 104 were among those the President cited as problematic. In Section 103, Congress outlined eight distinct declarations of foreign policy regarding the sale of nuclear material to India. The Congress were concerned mostly with nuclear material winding up in the hands of Iran, and thus mandated "...that presidents should report each year on whether India was fully cooperating to restrain the Iranian nuclear program." When President Bush signed the bill, he treated that demand as "advisory."
The author of this provision, Senator Tom Harkin (D.IA) has not taken lightly to President Bush's signing statement, arguing that it is "...outrageous that the President has repeatedly stated the greatest threat to U.S. national security is a nuclear Iran, yet explicitly rejects Congress’ declaration that it shall be the official policy of the United States that India will not use its nuclear technology to help develop Iran’s nuclear weapons arsenal" and with his signing statement has "...once again...shown he views Congress as a nuisance rather than an equal branch of government under the Constitution."
In addition, one part of Section 104 required the Nuclear Suppliers Group to sign off on the deal before it becomes binding. The NSG, which consists of 45 countries, was formed in 1974 in response to India's detonation of a nuclear bomb and is designed to enforce non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in particular by states that are considered outlaw or renegade in the international community (like Iran). President Bush also treated the NSG action as advisory, which has drawn the ire of Congressman Ed Markey (D.MA), who stated: "The President is turning decades of U.S. international policy on its head--and [is] thumbing his nose at Congress at the same time." Others worry that if the NSG refuses to sign off, President Bush will simply go forward and ignore the international organization, thus destroying an organization dedicated to keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of renegade states as well as undermining US credibility in the World on yet another issue.
But from the President's POV, he was catching a great deal of heat from India over what they perceived to be overly hostile language from the Congress, and language that does not treat the country as a sovereign nation. Leaders in India were "outraged" over the language prior to President Bush's signing statement, expressing concerns about "...certain extraneous and prescriptive clauses that may limit its strategic autonomy and independence of its foreign policy", and even after the signing statement, the "Prime Minister...still has some concerns." It is clear that from a foreign policy standpoint, the United States needs India as a balance to the growing influence of China, as well as a logger-head in the region to fight the GWOT.
So this is continuing to play out, but regardless of how it concludes, it gives us a nice insight into some of the pressures that drive a signing statement, and that it isn't always just the protection of prerogatives despite what the language may say.
